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The invisible law of visible difference: Disfigurement in the workplace 
 
By Hannah Saunders, Durham University 
 
Abstract: The Equality Act 2010 provides that people with severe disfigurements are deemed 
to be disabled. Through the lens of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
and models of disability, this article highlights a number of difficulties with the Act’s 
approach, including the problematic ‘severity’ threshold, the issue of complex conditions 
which include both disfigurement and functional impairment, and a lack of provision for 
progressively disfiguring conditions. Analysis is then provided of opportunities to mitigate 
these difficulties, specifically the concept of perceptive discrimination, and the application of 
the duty to make reasonable adjustments to disfiguring conditions. It is argued that the law 
needs to be reformed and options for change are presented. 
 
Introduction 
The Equality Act 2010 (‘the Act’) has been criticised for following the ‘medical model’, rather 
than the ‘social model’, in defining what counts as a disability1. The medical model ‘locates the 
“problem of disability” in the person’, whereas the social model ‘views disability as part of the 
diversity of the human experience, placing responsibility on society to remove the physical, 
environmental, attitudinal, and legal barriers that prevent people with disabilities from 
exercising their rights to inclusion and participation in society’2.  Although the Act locates itself 
primarily within the medical model of disability, the social model has proved internationally 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Anna Lawson, 'Disability and Employment in the Equality Act 2010: 
Opportunities Seized, Lost and Generated' (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 359, 364. 
2 Arlene Kanter, Development of Disability Rights under International Law (Routledge 2015) 
46. 
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influential3 and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities4 (‘CRPD’), in 
particular, is founded on a set of rights-based principles aligned to the social model of 
disability. 
 
One apparent exception to the medical model approach in the Act may be found in 
the inclusion of people with disfigurements within the meaning of disability. Disfigurement 
does not fit the traditional ‘medical’ model mould because it often lacks the functional limits 
on which the Act’s usual concept of disability is based; the ‘problem’ is not usually one of 
effects on the individual’s activities, but the perceptions and attitudes of other people. Its 
inclusion is, therefore, arguably a recognition of societal, rather than biological, barriers. 
However, incorporating this social ‘square peg’ into a legislative ‘round hole’ is not without 
its difficulties, and it is submitted that the law designed to secure equality for people with a 
visible difference remains under-developed.  
 
Part 1 of this article will consider the understanding of disability offered by the social 
model, the principles of disability policy provided by international law, and how these 
connect with the lived experience of visible difference as reported in existing research. Part 
2 will evaluate the Act’s provisions on disfigurement in the workplace, assessing the extent 
to which they achieve the aims of this overarching framework.   Finally, Part 3 will consider 
                                                     
3 Colin Barnes, Understanding the social model of disability: past, present and future’ in Nick 
Watson, Alan Roulstone and Carol Thomas, Routledge handbook of disability studies 
(Handbook of disability studies, London ; New York : Routledge 2012), 49. 
4 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities A/RES/61/106, 24 January 2007 
(CRPD). 
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options for reform, including both pragmatic, discrete amendments to the existing law, and 
a reconceptualization of the link between disfigurement and disability. 
 
At the outset, a brief word on terminology. It is perhaps no surprise that the 
language used to describe disability and its relation to the identity of the person has proved 
contentious, and the same goes for disfigurement. For some, a description of a person with 
a disability, or a disabled person, goes to the root of the concept, locating the disability 
either within the individual or in society’s treatment of her. For others, the term 
disfigurement is regarded by some as a negative and emotive word, but visible difference is 
not universally preferred. The issue has, for some, become one of felt categorisation, not 
just language, but the legislation is arguably too blunt to do justice to such human concerns. 
So, while it would not be realistic to produce a legal argument without reference to the 
words used in the statute, where appropriate this article will use the terminology of 
disfigurement and visible difference interchangeably. 
 
Part 1: An evaluative framework  
 
It was Mike Oliver, writing in 1983, who first coined the use of the phrase ‘the social 
model’5. He describes this as ‘nothing more or less fundamental than a switch away from 
focusing on the physical or mental limitations of particular individuals to the way the 
physical structures, societal systems, culture and social environments impose limitations on 
                                                     
5 The origins of the social model can be traced to the work of the Union of the Physically 
Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS). 
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certain groups or categories of people’6. The traditional UK conception of the social model is 
noted for its rigid distinction between impairment and disability; impairment could be 
‘lacking all or part of a limb … or mechanism of the body’7 whereas disability is ‘the 
disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organisation which 
takes little or no account of people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them 
from participation in the mainstream of social activities’8. Pursuant to this analysis, a 
disfigurement may be an impairment, but disablement arises from the expectations and 
reactions of society which oppress people who are visibly different. This social model 
analysis explains the siting of disfigurement within disability law; the individual’s 
participation in society can be disabled even when the functions of his body are not.     
 
 While the social model remains influential today, it is not without its critics.  One of 
the most common criticisms is that the social model’s focus on external barriers denies the 
reality of living with an impairment. The argument is that, in focusing on the societal 
construction of disability, the social model denies biological reality9. Pain, for example, can 
be a disabling effect of impairment which cannot be adequately explained by reference to 
external barriers. Similarly, just as socially constructed disability can curtail a person’s 
                                                     
6 Mike Oliver, Bob Sapey and Pam Thomas ‘Social Work with Disabled People’ (4th edition, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan 2012) 15. 
7UPIAS and the Disability Alliance, ‘Fundamental Principles of Disability’ (1975), 14, 
<https://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/library/UPIAS-
fundamental-principles.pdf> accessed 9 April 2018. 
8 ibid. 
9 See for example Dimitris Anastasiou and James M. Kauffman, 'The Social Model of 
Disability: Dichotomy between Impairment and Disability' (2013) 38 Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 4419. 
 5 
activities, sometimes so can the effects of impairment itself10. By way of example, 
Shakespeare and Watson memorably argued that ‘Most activists concede that behind 
closed doors they talk about aches and pains and urinary tract infections, even while they 
deny any relevance of the body while they are out campaigning’11. In contrast, Colin Barnes 
stresses the pragmatism of the ‘social model impairment, disability dichotomy’12 and 
highlights the danger of an academic debate which threatens to undermine the change in 
perception generated by the social model. To add further complexity, different conceptions 
of the social model have developed in different countries13, each with a varied emphasis.   
 
Without doubting the benefits of this debate, this article will not attempt to take a 
position within it. The focus here is on how the understanding of disfigurement offered by a 
broadly defined social model contrasts with the Act’s medical model ideology; a distinction 
between the two is evident however the social model is nuanced. References to the social 
model in this article are therefore to be understood simply as the idea that disability arises 
at least partly from the interaction between impairment and external environments and 
attitudes.  
 
 Given the importance of social model ideology to understanding the link between 
disfigurement (which often lacks functional impairment) and disability, I will now consider 
                                                     
10 Liz Crow, 'Renewing the Social Model of Disability' Coalition News <http://www.roaring-
girl.com/work/renewing-the-social-model-of-disability/>accessed 23/4/18. 
11Tom Shakespeare and Nicholas Watson, The social model of disability: An outdated 
ideology?, vol 2 (Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2001), 12. 
12 Barnes (n3) 53. 
13 Janine Owens, 'Exploring the critiques of the social model of disability: the transformative 
possibility of Arendt's notion of power' (2015) 37 Sociology of Health & Illness 385, 386. 
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briefly how this ideology has been reflected in conceptions of disability at the international 
level and the implications for people with a visible difference. The three instruments to be 
considered are the CRPD, the EU Employment Equality Framework Directive (Directive 
2000/78), and the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), together with relevant 
case law.  
 
When the UK ratified the CRPD and its Optional Protocol in 2009, it affirmed a set of 
broad principles aligned to the social model which applies principles of human rights in the 
context of disability. The breadth of its drafting has been interpreted, both domestically14 and 
by the CRPD Committee itself15, as offering states a margin of appreciation.  
 
Article 1 offers a description (note, not a definition) of disability wide enough to 
encompass both disfigurement and other types of disability: 
 
[…] 
‘Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others’16. 
                                                     
14 House of Lords Select Committee, The Equality Act 2010: the impact on disabled people, 
2016) (HL Paper 117) para 75 and 79. 
15 See e.g. Marie-Louise Jungelin v Sweden (2014) Communication No. 5/2011 Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities CRPD/C/12/D/5/2011, para 10.5:  a margin of 
appreciation to decide “the reasonableness and proportionality of accommodation 
measures”. 
16 CRPD (n4) art 1. 
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This description makes no mention of functional limitation (and the Committee has expressly 
confirmed that the definition applies to disabilities ‘that may or may not come with functional 
limitations’17). It also imposes no substantiality or severity requirement; it is the potential 
consequence, not the level, of the impairments and their interaction which matters. The 
drafting of Article 1 (in particular the word ‘include’ and the description in the Preamble of 
disability as an ‘evolving concept’18) is also not fixed or exhaustive, enabling it to sidestep the 
accusations of rigidity sometimes levelled at the social model.  
 
The CRPD sets out a number of general principles which are intended to inform its 
interpretation19, among them: 
 
‘(a) Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make 
one's own choices, and independence of persons;  
(b) Non-discrimination;  
(c) Full and effective participation and inclusion in society;  
(d) Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of 
human diversity and humanity;  
(e) Equality of opportunity; (…)’20 
                                                     
17 CRPD ‘General Comment No. 3 on Article 6’ (2016) CRPD/C/GC/3, para 5. 
18 Wiebke Ringel, 'Non-discrimination, Accommodation, and Intersectionality under the 
CRPD: New Trends and Challenges for the UN Human Rights System' (2017) 20 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law Online 98, 106. 
19 Anna Lawson, The United Nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities : 
new era or false dawn? (Syracuse, N.Y. : Syracuse University, College of Law. 2007) 591. 
20 CRPD (n4) art 3. 
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There are accompanying general obligations21 on state parties (including an obligation to take 
measures to eliminate discrimination22), and a series of specific obligations, the most relevant 
for present purposes being Equality and Non-Discrimination23, Awareness-Raising24, Access to 
Justice25, Respect for Privacy26 and Work and Employment27. The main practical limitation of 
the CRPD is that, although individuals in the UK can complain to the CRPD Committee over 
alleged breaches, they cannot (currently, at least28) directly enforce it, but the CRPD is binding 
in international law and provides a strong framework of good disability policy. 
 
A similar approach to non-functional disability is emerging in the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’)29. Article 14 of the ECHR provides a right to non-
discrimination related to other Convention rights. The ECtHR has held that this right not 
only encompasses disability but also ‘health status’, which it seems willing to apply even 
where there is no resulting functional limitation. In the case of I.B. v Greece, for example, an 
HIV positive claimant was found to fall within Article 14 despite the fact that ‘the nature of 
the applicant’s job, which did not demand excessive effort, precluded the risk of a reduction 
                                                     
21 ibid art 4. 
22 ibid art 4(e).  
23 ibid art 5. 
24 ibid art 8. 
25 ibid art 13. 
26 Ibid art 22. 
27 ibid art 27. 
28 The 2017 Labour Party manifesto includes a commitment to enact the CRPD into UK law if 
they win power. 
29 For a more detailed discussion, see Andrea Broderick, 'A reflection on substantive equality 
jurisprudence: The standard of scrutiny at the ECtHR for differential treatment of Roma and 
persons with disabilities' (2015) 15 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 101. 
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in his capacity for work since, during the many years in which a person was merely HIV-
positive, his or her working capacity was not substantially reduced’30. In the case of Kiyutin v 
Russia31, the court placed particular weight on the historic stigma against and exclusion of 
people with HIV and afforded states a narrow margin of appreciation as a result. Consistent 
with the social model of disability, the court recognised the disabling impact of attitudinal 
barriers. It is submitted that a parallel argument could be made in relation to people with 
disfigurements who often face stigmatisation and exclusion. Where engaged32, the wider 
reach of Article 14 may prove to be a useful interpretive tool in respect of shortcomings in 
domestic disfigurement law.    
 
As the EU is a party to the CRPD, the EU Employment Equality Framework Directive 
(Directive 2000/78) (‘the Directive’) ‘must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the Convention’33. Relevant domestic legislation, including the Act, in turn 
needs to comply with the Directive, the ECHR and the CRPD, which would seem to offer a 
good opportunity for a common approach. However, that opportunity has not been seized, 
and case law on the Directive from the Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has not consistently reflected 
CRPD principles34 in this respect.  
                                                     
30 Application no. 552/10, judgment 3 October 2013, para 86. 
31 Application no. 2700/10, judgment 10 March 2011, para 64. 
32 See e.g. Sandra Fredman, 'Emerging from the Shadows: Substantive Equality and Article 
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights' (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 273, 
for a discussion of the ‘parasitic’ nature of article 14. 
33 Joined cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Ring v Dansk 
almennyttigt Boligselskab and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v 
Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S (Ring and Skouboe Werge), 
EU: C:2013:222, para 32. 
34 Lisa Waddington, 'Saying All the Right Things and Still Getting it Wrong' (2015) 22 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 576, 583. See also Gauthier de Beco, 
'Is obesity a disability? The definition of disability by the Court of Justice of the European 
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In the case of Ring35, the ECJ provided a definition of disability which appeared to 
embrace the social model. It defined disability for the purposes of the Directive as: 
 
‘a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective 
participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other 
workers’36. 
 
But subsequent applications of this definition have been restrictive and have implications 
for disfigurement37. In the case of Kaltoft38, the court adopted the Ring definition but 
elaborated on the need for a limitation resulting from impairment.  In Kaltoft, in the context 
of obesity, the court suggested that ‘reduced mobility or the onset, in that person, of 
medical conditions preventing him from carrying out his work or causing discomfort when 
carrying out his professional activity’39 could suffice. So, the limitation is being interpreted 
as something the individual is physically unable, or less able, to do in professional life as a 
result of the impairment. As Lisa Waddington argues, ‘this seems to render it difficult to 
interpret the Court’s definition of disability as embracing individuals who experience no 
physical limitation, but who are only hampered by the discriminatory attitudes of others, 
                                                     
Union and its consequences for the application of EU anti-discrimination law' (2016) 22 
Columbia Journal of European Law 381, 383. 
35 Ring (n33). 
36 ibid para 34. 
37 Waddington (n34), 588. 
38 Case C‑354/13 FOA  v Kommuneres Landsforening (Kaltoft)  (Court of Justice). 
39 ibid para 60. 
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discriminatory rules or provisions’40.  This interpretation is strengthened by the reference in 
the subsequent case of Daouidi to a limitation of ’capacity’41. It is clear that the required 
limitation can be a partial hindrance rather than an absolute prevention, but someone who 
has no physical limitation at all, and is disabled purely by external attitudinal barriers 
(someone with a pure disfigurement, or someone who is HIV positive42 but asymptomatic, 
perhaps), may not be disabled under the Directive.  
 
This interpretation appears to create significant distance between the Directive’s 
concept of disability, and that espoused by Article 1 of the CRPD, despite the latter 
purportedly being used to interpret the former.  What does this mean for someone with a 
visible difference? It means that a claimant who is left without a domestic remedy because 
of a shortcoming in the way that the Act deals with disfigurement is unlikely to be able to 
rely on the Directive. It also means that Parliament and the British courts are receiving 
conflicting messages from the wider disability law framework about the scope of disability 
relating to impairments without functional limitation. This lack of functional consistency 
risks diluting the strong agenda for reform provided by the social model and CRPD. 
 
This article will use social model principles (and their embodiment in the CRPD) to 
evaluate the Act’s treatment of people who are visibly different. However, a simple 
comparison of how the Act’s approach is different from the social model and CRPD falls 
                                                     
40 Waddington (n34) 587. 
41 Case C-395/15 Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL, para 48. See also Case C-270/16 Ruiz Conejero v 
Ferroser Servicios Auxiliares and Ministerio Fiscal, para 28. 
42 See Peter McTigue, 'From Navas to Kaltoft' (2015) 15 International Journal of 
Discrimination and the Law 241 for a fuller discussion of ECJ case law in relation to HIV as a 
disability. 
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short of being truly useful. This is because, by the time the Act came into force in 2010, the 
UK had already ratified the CRPD, but still chose to retain its existing legislative roots in the 
medical model of disability. The contrasts between the Act and its overarching framework 
are therefore intentional; highlighting them is unlikely, without more, to stimulate a change 
of approach in the medium term. On that basis, the CRPD and social model principles will 
also be drawn on to explore how solutions can be found within the Act’s existing ideology. 
 
The lived experience of visible difference 
 
An estimated 1.3 million people in the UK have a significant disfigurement (569,000 of which 
are facial)43 and a large amount of research has been undertaken into the lived experience 
of visible difference. While recognising the impossibility of accurately representing the 
nuances of a rich body of scholarship in a few paragraphs, three general themes are worthy 
of comment.  Visible difference: (i) often has a negative impact on social interaction, ii) can 
lead to distressing psychological consequences for those affected, and iii) is the subject of 
subconscious bias which causes some people to associate visible difference with negative 
personality traits. These three themes will be discussed in turn. 
 
First, the social consequences. Studies have shown that people living with 
disfigurements often have heightened concern over social interaction, particularly with 
strangers, expecting negative reactions from others44 and avoiding social situations as a 
                                                     
43 Changing Faces, ‘Disfigurement in the UK’ May 2017. 
44 Emma Robinson, 'Psychological research on visible differences in adults' in Richard 
Lansdown and others (eds), Visibly Different (Butterworth-Heinemann 1997) 103. 
 13 
result45. Negative reactions are sometimes explicit, but many people with a visible 
difference also report implicit awkwardness such as ‘the guarded references, the common 
everyday words suddenly made taboo, the fixed stare elsewhere, the artificial levity, the 
compulsive loquaciousness, the awkward solemnity’46. A recent survey by the charity 
Changing Faces47, which supports people with disfigurements to face or body, found that 
81% of visibly different participants had experienced staring, comments or unpleasantness 
from a stranger, and 33% believed they had been the victim of a disfigurement hate crime 
(though only 30% of those had reported it). 
 
While some scholarship has mooted that negative expectations of others may lead 
to self-fulfilling prophecies48, studies have also demonstrated that such concerns about the 
reactions of others are frequently well-founded, with the general public tending to avoid 
interaction with people with disfigurements where possible, choosing to stand further away 
on the street49, not to sit next to them on a train,50 and to be less likely to donate to a 
charity collection if the collector has a visible difference.51 One study of people with 
                                                     
45 Andrew Thompson and Gerry Kent, 'Adjusting to disfigurement: processes involved in 
dealing with being visibly different' (2001) 21 Clinical Psychology Review 663, 666. 
46 Fred Davis, 'Deviance Disavowal: The Management of Strained Interaction by the Visibly 
Handicapped' (1961) 9 Social Problems 120, 123. 
47 Changing Faces (n43). 
48 Alan Feingold, 'Good- Looking People Are Not What We Think' (1992) 111 Psychological 
Bulletin 304; Robinson (n44) 103. 
49 Nicola Ramsey, Ray Bull and D Gahagan, 'The Effects of Facial Disfigurement on the 
Proxemic Behaviour of the General Public' (1982) 12 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 
137. Interestingly, the study found that people stood further away from a person with a 
permanent congenital disfigurement than from someone with a temporary facial injury, 
illustrating the difficulty in making cross-condition comparisons. 
50 Vicky Houston and Ray Bull, 'Do people avoid sitting next to someone who is facially 
disfigured?' (1994) 24 European Journal of Social Psychology 279. 
51 Ray Bull and Julia Stevens, 'The effects of facial disfigurement on helping behaviour' 
(1981) 8 Italian Journal of Psychology 25. 
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psoriasis reported that 20% of participants had been asked to leave a restaurant, swimming 
pool or other public place because of their appearance.52 Research also demonstrates this 
pattern affecting the workplace, with people who disclosed a visible difference less likely to 
be interviewed53 and more likely to be paid less54 and significant numbers believing that 
they have been discriminated against by colleagues and managers55. It is worth noting, 
though, that the aetiology of the visible difference may affect the individual’s experience, 
with some conditions being better received or understood than others56. 
 
The relevance of the social model of disability here is immediately apparent; the 
attitudes of other people towards visible difference have the power not just to isolate 
socially, but to prevent participation in certain activities, to compromise personal security 
and privacy, and reduce the ability to support oneself financially necessitating dependence 
on others. The perceptions of other people can create disability even though the physical 
impairment of disfigurement often produces few, if any, limits on what the individual can 
do. Visible difference without other impairment effects embodies the strong social model 
impairment-disability dichotomy. 
 
                                                     
52 I Ginsburg and B Link, ‘Feelings of stigmatization in patients with psoriasis’ (1989) cited in 
Gerry Kent and Steve Keohane, 'Social anxiety and disfigurement: The moderating effects of 
fear of negative evaluation and past experience' (2001) 40 British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology 23, 24. 
53Anna Stone and Toby Wright, 'When your face doesn’t fit: employment discrimination 
against people with facial disfigurements' (2013) 43 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 
515. 
54 Daniel S Hamermesh, Beauty Pays (Princeton University Press 2011). 
55 Changing Faces (n43). 
56 Frances Cooke Macgregor, 'Facial disfigurement: Problems and management of social 
interaction and implications for mental health' (1990) 14 Official Journal of the International 
Society of Plastic Surgery 249, 251. 
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Second, and perhaps unsurprisingly, psychological effects within this group, such as 
low self-confidence57, negative self-image, anxiety and depression58 are often reported. One 
study59 found that people with facial disfigurements had fear questionnaire scores 
equivalent to people with social phobia. The strength of the connection between social 
stigma and psychological distress suggests that attitudinal barriers can be internalised by 
those affected, creating lowered expectations and intensifying disability; external barriers 
can create internal barriers.  
 
Third, implicit bias. Studies demonstrate character assumptions and a learned bias 
against visibly different faces, with photographs being judged as less honest, less 
employable, less trustworthy, less optimistic, less effective, less capable, less intelligent, less 
popular, and less attractive than photographs of a control group60. The pernicious problem 
of implicit bias makes challenging discrimination harder; it can be difficult to ascertain the 
true motivation for a decision where even the decision-maker may not appreciate what 
underlies it. The perceived link between visible difference and negative character traits 
means that people can be disabled not just by erroneous assumptions about ‘what they 
can’t do’ but also by insidious suppositions about ‘what sort of person they are’.  
 
                                                     
57 Robinson (n44) 103. 
58 S Jowett and T Ryan, ‘Skin disease and handicap: an analysis of the impact of skin 
conditions’ (1985) 20 Soc. Sci. Med. 425, 427. 
59 R. Newell and I. Marks, 'Phobic nature of social difficulty in facially disfigured people' 
(2000) 176 The British journal of psychiatry : the journal of mental science 177. 
60 Marlene Rankin and Gregory Borah, 'Perceived Functional Impact of Abnormal Facial 
Appearance' (2002) 111 Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery 2140. 
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Underlying all three ‘themes’ of the lived experience is the problem of stigma and 
(conscious and unconscious) bias. The CRPD imposes an obligation on states to address such 
underlying prejudice proactively, including awareness-raising campaigns61, measures to 
foster respect for the rights and dignity of disabled people62, and the promotion of 
employment of disabled people in the private sector63.  But considerable flexibility is left to 
state parties in deciding how best to achieve this. Some valuable measures (public 
awareness campaigns, for example) may not require the force of law64. But proactivity in a 
legal context tends to suggest the creation of positive duties. Positive duties can impose 
specific equality obligations on particular groups (public bodies, or all employers for 
example) rather than relying on individuals to respond to discrimination reactively with a 
legal claim.  
Positive duties play only a small part in employment equality law in the UK, which 
focuses instead on an individual complaints-led model65. One exception to this statement is 
the inclusion, in s.149 of the Act, of a positive duty on public authorities to have ‘due regard’ 
to specific equality objectives. A detailed discussion of the s.149 duty is outside the scope of 
this article, but the duty has been widely criticised for not going far enough (its scope is 
procedural rather than requiring public authorities to take steps to achieve the equality 
                                                     
61 CRPD art 8 (2)(a). 
62 CRPD art 8 (a). 
63 CRPD art 27 (1)(h). 
64 ‘Concluding observations on the initial report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’ CRPD/C/GBR/CO/1  (3 October 2017) recommends the UK take 
awareness-raising measures to “include mass media strategies and campaigns, with 
different target audience groups”; See also House of Lords Select Committee (n14) para 191 
and 192. 
65 Sandra Fredman, 'The Public Sector Equality Duty' (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 405, 
407; House of Lords Select Committee (n14) para 345 and 346. 
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objectives66, and some scholarship has highlighted inconsistent levels of meaningful 
compliance67). The potential for positive duties to combat disfigurement prejudice is an area 
for future research.   
Notwithstanding a scarcity of positive duties, and a limited ability of the complaints-
led model to counter the structural causes of discrimination68, it will be argued in the 
following section that the Act’s disfigurement provisions are counter-productive and fail 
effectively to challenge prejudice, serving to reinforce stigma and marginalization and 
restrict awareness of the rights and dignity of people who are visibly different.   
 
 
Part 2: The statutory provisions 
 
Discrimination against people with visible differences is, at least to some extent, prohibited 
by disability provisions in the Act. The definition of disability is contained within Section 6 of 
the Act: 
 
‘A person (P) has a disability if— 
(a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and 
(b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to 
carry out normal day-to-day activities.’ 
                                                     
66Fredman ibid 410. 
67 See, for example, Simonetta Manfredi, Lucy Vickers and Kate Clayton-Hathaway, 'The 
Public Sector Equality Duty: Enforcing Equality Rights Through Second-Generation 
Regulation' (2017) October 2017 Industrial Law Journal.  
68 Fredman (n65) 408.  
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While someone with a visible difference, without other functional limitations, would be 
unlikely to satisfy the standard definition of disability contained within section 6, Schedule 
169 deems that an impairment which consists of a severe disfigurement is to be treated as 
having a substantial adverse effect on the ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. 
This removes the need for the individual to have to demonstrate the functional 
disadvantage required by the standard definition, albeit that he still has to demonstrate that 
the impairment is long-term (meaning that it has lasted, or is likely to last, for at least 12 
months, or for the rest of the life of the person affected70). 
 
How severe is ‘severe’? 
There is no further definition within the Act on what constitutes a severe disfigurement, but 
the Guidance provides:  
‘Examples of disfigurements include scars, birthmarks, limb or postural deformation 
(including restricted bodily development), or diseases of the skin. Assessing severity 
will be mainly a matter of the degree of the disfigurement which may involve taking 
into account factors such as the nature, size, and prominence of the disfigurement. 
However, it may be necessary to take account of where the disfigurement in 
question is (e.g. on the back as opposed to the face).’71 
                                                     
69 EA 2010, sched 1, pt 1, s 3. 
70 EA 2010, sched 1, pt 1, s 2. 
71 Office for Disability Issues, ‘Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining 
questions relating the issue of disability, Para B25, 
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The Act makes no distinction between congenital or acquired conditions, though tattoos 
which have not been removed, and piercings, are expressly excluded.72  
The open scope of this concept has, to some extent, been addressed in case law, but 
with little resultant clarity.  In Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd -v- Edwards73, the claimant worked in a 
mobile ‘phone shop, and was asked to wear a company polo shirt. He suffered from Poland 
syndrome which caused a significant asymmetry of his chest cavity which, he felt, would 
have been obvious when wearing a polo shirt. His condition also made some movements 
(e.g. pushing / pulling) more difficult. The first instance Tribunal decided that Mr Edwards 
had a severe disfigurement, but this was appealed, with the respondent arguing that the 
Tribunal did not have enough evidence in front of it on which to reach this conclusion. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal (‘EAT’) expressed discomfort about being asked to make visual 
judgments on the extent of a disfigurement evidenced photographically or in person, 
recognising that ‘the protection is afforded to those for whom issues of appearance are 
likely to be particularly sensitive’74.  The EAT concluded instead that it was entitled to take 
into account ‘the impact of the disfigurement on the claimant’75 in assessing the severity of 
a disfigurement – in other words, the claimant’s perception of, and behavioural response to 
it. By promoting ‘a degree of sensitivity’76 in the evidential requirements for establishing 
severe disfigurement, the EAT introduced both flexibility for claimants and uncertainty for 
respondents, accepting that different forms of evidence may suffice in different cases. The 
                                                     
<https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/odi_definition_of_disability_eq
uality_act_guidance_may.pdf> accessed 9 April 2018. 
72 The Equality Act 2010 (Disability) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/2128, reg 5. 
73 [2014] UKEAT/0467/13/DM. 
74 ibid para 56. 
75 ibid para 55. 
76 ibid para 57. 
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EAT did, however, conclude that the test for severe disfigurement could not be wholly 
subjective; ‘not simply what the claimant believed to be the case’77.  
 
Prima facie, this decision is favourable to claimants, allowing more people to meet 
the evidential threshold and balancing the Act’s requirements of process with ‘respect for 
inherent dignity’78 of the claimant. However, it could conceivably disadvantage claimants 
whose disfigurements are borderline in their severity, but who have not allowed their life 
choices to be inhibited. Tribunals must guard against this, as it threatens to remove access 
to justice for those who have exercised a ‘full and effective participation in society’79; the 
antithesis of what disability law policy, enshrined in the principles of the CRPD, seeks to 
achieve.  
 
The bodily location of disfigurement 
 
Returning to the Guidance80, it is clear that the bodily location of the disfigurement is one 
factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the severe disfigurement threshold test 
is met. In Blyth v Historic Scotland81, for example, the Tribunal noted that the claimant’s 
psoriasis was mainly on her torso and legs; parts of her body which she covered up. The 
Tribunal found her not to have a severe disfigurement. In Whyte v First Capital East Ltd82, 
again the EAT found that the claimant’s folliculitis on his back was not a severe 
                                                     
77 ibid para 60. 
78 CRPD article 3(a). 
79 CRPD article 1. 
80 Office for Disability Issues (n71). 
81 [2001] ET/S/400514/00. 
82 [2005] UKEAT/0686/04/DM. 
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disfigurement, commenting that ‘location is important as it affects ordinary people’s 
judgment about its severity…protection against discrimination … is more necessary when it 
is visible on the face than when it is invisible on the backside’83 [sic].  
 
This focus on invisibility suggests that the rationale for the guidance lies at least 
partly in how likely the disfigurement is, given its location, to be seen by others.  On one 
level, this seems both logical and in line with the social model of disability, reflecting the 
frequency with which attitudinal barriers would be expected to be encountered. But, while 
recognising that facial disfigurements can be particularly challenging for those affected, on 
closer analysis the possibility that this guidance will be used to exclude non-facial 
disfigurements from equality protection is troubling in two respects.  
 
First, it creates an expectation that a disfigurement which can be covered, should be 
covered; or, at least, that legal redress may be limited where it could have been covered. 
While the Guidance which accompanies the Act provides that: 
 
‘[a]ccount should be taken of how far a person can reasonably be expected to modify 
his or her behaviour, for example by use of a coping or avoidance strategy, to prevent or 
reduce the effects of an impairment on normal day-to-day activities’84,  
 
the emphasis of these coping mechanisms is on small, practical activity choices, such as 
avoiding skiing, but not shopping, to alleviate back pain. The issue of coping mechanisms is 
                                                     
83 ibid para 34. 
84 Office for Disability Issues (n71) para B7. 
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not directly relevant to severe disfigurements which, as discussed above, do not need to 
satisfy the substantial adverse effect test. But linking the bodily location of a disfigurement 
with its severity imports a similar expectation; that a person will cope by hiding their 
difference. Far from being a small, practical activity choice, this goes to the root of the 
individual’s self-identity and body image. The respect for difference and human diversity85 
emphasised in the CRPD reflects a move away from the ‘care or cure’ approach to disability, 
embodied in the medical model, towards an approach which values disability not as ‘a 
“mistake” of society but an element of its diversity’86.   Restricting access to justice in 
situations where diversity can be covered up is a retrograde step which shifts the focus 
away from the employer’s alleged discriminatory behaviour back to the specifics of 
individual impairment. 
 
 The second concern with the focus on the visibility of the bodily location stems from 
the risk of conflating visibility and knowledge. While a disfigurement in a visible place, such 
as the face, is very likely to become known to others, the converse is not necessarily true; 
disfigurements in places of the body often covered by clothes can also become ‘known’. 
They could, for example, be disclosed voluntarily, gleaned from a sick note, or visible in hot 
weather. So, while facial disfigurements are likely to be noticed and at risk of stigmatisation, 
thus meriting legal redress, it isn’t the case that disfigurements on the torso are immune 
from such stigma or undeserving of legal remedy if they do give rise to discrimination.  
 
                                                     
85 CRPD art 3(d). 
86 United Nations, The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Training Guide 
(2014), Module 1, B. 
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It is submitted that, instead of using the likelihood of a disfigurement being noticed 
to exclude some people from the definition of disability, the better approach (and one 
which reinforces the CRPD’s focus on hindered participation) is for the employer’s actual 
knowledge and conduct to be assessed on the facts of each case in determining whether 
discrimination has taken place.   
 
Progressive conditions 
Although the Act makes provision for progressive conditions generally87, (the Act provides 
that a person with a progressive condition is protected as a disabled person from the first 
time when his impairment has some adverse effect, provided that the adverse effect is likely 
to become substantial in the future) similar protection has not been afforded to people with 
progressively disfiguring conditions, such as neurofibromatosis type 188 or vitilgo89, which 
are likely to lead to severe disfigurement.  
The progressive condition provision under the Act was introduced to combat stigma 
before the condition reached a stage where the substantial adverse effects test was 
satisfied; a recognition of social barriers pre-empting functional barriers. HIV, multiple 
sclerosis and cancer are expressly included as disabilities90, rather than being left to fall 
under the progressive conditions provision, because they were identified as conditions 
which could be diagnosed and lead to stigmatisation while the affected person was 
                                                     
87 EA 2010 Sched 1, Pt 1, s 8. 
88 Neurofibromatosis Type 1 is a genetic condition which can cause (usually benign) tumours 
to grow over time along the nerves, both inside the body and on the skin. In some people, it 
also causes other symptoms such as scoliosis, high blood pressure and learning difficulties. 
89 Vitiligo causes patches of skin to lose pigmentation, often progressively. 
90 EA 2010 Sched 1, Pt 1, s 6(1). 
 24 
asymptomatic, thereby also failing the progressive condition test. There is an obvious 
parallel here with progressively disfiguring conditions, which may never produce an adverse 
effect on day-to-day activities, but which can lead to stigmatization from an early stage.  
The CRPD does not discuss progressive conditions, because it does not need to; its 
concept of disability is not limited by reference to a given level of impairment.  Someone 
with a progressively disfiguring condition would be covered by the CRPD from the moment 
that the condition, in interaction with various barriers, has the potential to hinder full 
participation in society.  The failure to extend the progressive condition protection to 
disfigurement is therefore out of step with the CRPD. It is arguable that, if this point were 
tested in court, this gap could be easily filled without sacrificing the integrity of the Act’s 
existing provisions. However, the lack of clarity may discourage such claims being brought in 
the first place. 
The discussion so far has raised several concerns which are, directly or indirectly, 
related to one thing: the threshold test of severity. The real question is therefore not how 
severity should be determined, but whether the severity threshold should exist at all. 
 
Why have a severity threshold? 
 
When the severity threshold for disfigurement was first introduced (in the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (‘DDA’), which preceded the Act), Parliamentary records show that 
the rationale was a presumed assumption that more serious disfigurements will always elicit 
worse discrimination. This was questioned during the passage of the Bill through the Lords, 
as follows: 
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‘The Government protect those with severe disfigurement; but, as the charity 
Changing Faces makes clear, discrimination is not related to the severity of 
disfigurement or to the severity of disability. Small wounds can be very disfiguring, 
whereas a large burn carried by an airman may be worn with pride as a sign of war. 
Alternatively, mild facial palsy is, for example, very isolating. Therefore, it is not size, 
it is not seriousness and it is not the conspicuousness of disfigurement which affects 
the person's ability to cope: it is another person's perception of it. Yet, such a person 
would not be protected under the provisions of the Bill.91’ 
However, the amendment proposed to resolve the issue was one of perceived disability 
rather than one directed specifically at disfigurement. At the time, perceived discrimination 
was not provided for within the DDA (although it has subsequently been incorporated into 
the Act) and the amendment was not passed. Arguments that ‘if the definition of disability 
is too narrowly drawn, there may well be people who are disabled but who are not 
protected’92, were overridden to prevent the net being drawn so widely that ‘the issue falls 
into some form of disrespect; or … the provisions cannot be operated and the very people 
whom we wish to help are not helped93’. However, with the benefit of twenty years of 
hindsight, the binary distinction in the Act between severe and non-severe disfigurements 
still appears hard to justify for the following reasons:  
 
1. Studies in the field of psychology continue to confirm that this assumption of clinical 
severity leading to worse consequences is wholly unreliable: reactions to minor or 
                                                     
91 HL Deb, 1995, v564, c1642 Baroness Hollis of Heigham. 
92 ibid, v564, c1650. 
93 ibid, v564, c1650, Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish. 
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moderate disfigurements, in terms of the psychosocial impact on the individual, can 
often be as damaging as those experienced by people with severe disfigurements94 
and, despite variability, there is evidence that some people with relatively minor 
disfiguring conditions experience higher levels of both depression and social anxiety 
than their more severely disfigured counterparts95.  
 
2. The severity threshold for disfigurement is inconsistent with the threshold test for 
disability in the Act, that of ‘substantial adverse effect’. ‘Substantial’ is defined in the 
Act as ‘more than minor or trivial’96 which has, in turn, been interpreted as a 
relatively low standard. An ordinary reading of the word ‘severe’ denotes a higher 
threshold than ‘substantial’ (as evidenced, for example, by national security threat 
levels where severe is a more serious level than substantial). This suggests that 
functional impairments are treated by the Act as more disabling than the social 
barriers of disfigurement, necessitating staggered thresholds for the law to engage. 
Once again, this sits uncomfortably with a body of evidence which demonstrates 
that people with a disfigurement are as likely to suffer discrimination in the 
workplace as people with other types of disability. As mentioned above, studies have 
found that a person with a disfigurement is at least as likely to be discriminated 
against in the job application process as someone in a wheelchair97, although 
                                                     
94 See e.g. Frances Cooke Macgregor, 'Social and Psychological Implications of Dentofacial 
Disfigurement' (1970) 40 The Angle Orthodontist 231, 232. 
95 Nichola Rumsey and others, 'Altered body image: appearance‐ related concerns of people 
with visible disfigurement' (2004) 48 Journal of Advanced Nursing 443. 
96 EA 2010 s 212(1). 
97 Sarah V. Stevenage and Yolanda McKay, 'Model applicants: The effect of facial 
appearance on recruitment decisions' (1999) 90 British Journal of Psychology 221; Anna 
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interestingly one of the studies found this was only prevalent in sectors involving a 
high degree of customer contact98, perhaps indicating that employers are fearful of 
the reactions of customers. Similarly, an American study asked workers about their 
levels of discomfort in working with people with different disabilities, and a facial 
disfigurement featured highly in the rankings of reported discomfort99. There 
appears, therefore, to be little justification for imposing a higher threshold for 
equality rights based on disfigurement than on other types of disability. 
 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the ‘severity’ threshold for disfigurement is unjustified and 
inconsistent. In contrast to the CRPD, in which ‘the challenge facing a person with a 
disability is measured in terms of the existing barriers and not on the category or 
percentage of the impairment’100, the severity threshold represents a familiar retreat to the 
ideology of the medical model, pushing the focus back onto the level of impairment.  Given 
the sensitivity of issues of appearance (as recognised by the EAT in Edwards), requiring a 
person to prove that he is ‘severely disfigured’ as a precondition to challenging 
discrimination runs counter to the principles of respect for difference101 and the inherent 
dignity of the person102, and inhibits effective access to justice103 as required by the CRPD. 
                                                     
Stone and Toby Wright, 'When your face doesn't fit: employment discrimination against 
people with facial disfigurements' (2013) 43 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 515 
98 Stone and Wright, ibid. 
99 Gwen Jones and Dianna Stone, 'Perceived discomfort associated with working with 
persons with varying disabilities' (1995) 81 Perceptual and Motor Skills 911, 915. 
100 Nations, The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Training Guide(n86) 
Module 1, D (d). 
101 CRPD art 3(d). 
102 CRPD art 3(a). 
103 CRPD art 13. 
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For these reasons, it is submitted that the severity requirement should be completely 
removed.  
 
A matter of pure aesthetics   
 
A further hurdle arises in the interpretation of a disability which ‘consists of’ severe 
disfigurement. In Cosgrove –v- Northern Ireland Ambulance Service104, the claimant had 
psoriasis which amounted to a severe disfigurement but which the parties agreed would 
not, but for the ‘deemed disability’ provision of severe disfigurement which existed under 
the DDA 1995 at the time (and which was similar for this purpose to the current provisions 
under the Act), have satisfied the definition of disability. He was denied a job as an 
ambulance person due to the risk of irritants aggravating his condition at work, an increased 
risk of infection for him through broken skin, and an increased risk of cross-infection for his 
patients. Mr Cosgrove argued that this amounted to disability-related discrimination but his 
argument hinged on whether the impairment was the psoriasis as a whole (argued by Mr 
Cosgrove) or merely the disfiguring aspect of the psoriasis. This interpretation was crucial 
because, while the refusal of the job was causally connected to the symptoms of psoriasis, 
particularly broken skin, it was not connected to the disfiguring appearance of the psoriasis.  
 
The Court of Appeal (NI) decided that ‘[a]n impairment ‘consisting of’ disfigurement 
means, in common parlance, that the impairment relates solely to the cosmetic aspect of 
the condition’105. Although the claim was decided in relation to disability-related 
                                                     
104 [2007] IRLR 397. 
105 ibid para 16. 
 29 
discrimination, it appears likely that it would also apply in relation to other forms, such as 
discrimination arising from a disability.  
 
It is questionable whether this narrow interpretation of a disability consisting of a 
severe disfigurement made much practical difference to a claimant in Mr Cosgrove’s 
medical context, as the treatment could perhaps have been objectively justified, subject to a 
meaningful risk assessment process being carried out. However, the narrow interpretation 
could make a greater impact in other contexts. Had Mr Cosgrove applied for an office job, 
for example, the identified risks would presumably have been much reduced and, as a 
consequence, the withdrawal of the offer much less likely to be objectively justifiable. But 
his claim would still have failed as the withdrawal of the job offer would not arise from the 
disfiguring aspect of his condition.  
 
The real problem with Cosgrove stems from the statutory wording (‘a disability 
which consists of a severe disfigurement’), but the court’s literal interpretation missed an 
opportunity to tackle this; they commented that if someone in Mr Cosgrove’s situation was 
intended to be included with the embrace of the relevant section, ‘a phrase such as 
“includes severe disfigurement” could have been used’106. The decision leaves many people 
who have a complex disfiguring condition (by which I mean one which includes an element 
of disfigurement and some other symptoms or effects) in an ‘either/or’ position; if aiming to 
prove disability under the standard test in s.6 of the Act, the aesthetic aspect of the 
condition is irrelevant,  but if applying the deeming provision for severe disfigurements, the 
                                                     
106 Cosgrove (n104) para 16. 
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non-aesthetic aspects of the condition are not protected against discrimination. This runs 
contrary to the way in which other disabilities under the Act are dealt with, where a 
cumulative approach to minor functional impairments is taken107.  
 
Cosgrove encapsulates the conflict between the social and medical models; its 
graceless approach implies that someone can be disabled either by attitudes towards 
people who look different or by functional effects of their impairment – but not both. By 
implication, the law declares that Mr Cosgrove encountered ‘the wrong type of barrier’, 
which is a far cry from the more complex ‘interaction with various barriers’108 envisaged in 
the CRPD. As a Northern Irish decision, Cosgrove is persuasive but not binding in England 
and Wales or Scotland, which may allow an opportunity for the limitations of the decision to 
be departed from.  
 
Having set out the limitations of the Act’s approach to disfigurement, there are two 
avenues which, though not featuring significantly in the reported case law on disfigurement 
discrimination, may contribute to mitigating these limitations:  perceptive discrimination, 




Someone with, say, a moderate disfigurement, who does not satisfy the ‘severe’ 
threshold test, may be able to base a claim of direct discrimination or harassment on the 
                                                     
107 Office for Disability Issues (n71) para B4-B6. 
108 CRPD art 1. 
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respondent’s perception that he has a severe disfigurement. Perceptive discrimination 
claims recognise that discrimination can occur on the basis of a protected characteristic 
which the victim does not have. By way of example, in English v Thomas Sanderson Ltd109, 
Mr English brought a successful harassment claim when he was subjected to a campaign of 
homophobic verbal harassment, despite the fact that he was heterosexual. Perceptive 
discrimination embodies the social model of disability, in that it recognises that disability 
can be externally created, not inherent within the individual.  
 
Claims based on perception are permitted under the Act because the wording of 
both s. 13 (direct discrimination) and s.26 (harassment) is wide enough to allow a claim to 
be brought where the claimant does not actually have the protected characteristic (in this 
case, disability). Assume the example of an employee with a small facial haemangioma who 
is called an offensive nickname at work and told that he cannot be promoted to a client-
facing role because of his face. The law’s perception of his level of disfigurement may be 
different from those of his employer and colleagues, in that a Tribunal may find his 
disfigurement to be only moderate, so not disabling. But a claim that he has been 
discriminated against and / or harassed because of his employer’s perception may enable 
this gap to be bridged.  
 
However, discrimination because of perceived disability claims are not 
straightforward because disability (unlike, say race or sex) has a threshold test (set out in s.6 
of the Act) which a claimant has to meet. To what extent does the decision-maker have to 
                                                     
109 (2009) I.C.R. 543. 
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know of, or put his mind to, the elements of that specific legal test before he can be said to 
perceive disability? In the recent case of Coffey, the EAT confirmed that: 
 
‘[T]he answer will not depend on whether the putative discriminator A perceives B 
to be disabled as a matter of law; in other words, it will not depend on A's 
knowledge of disability law. It will depend on whether A perceived B to have an 
impairment with the features which are set out in the legislation.’110 
 
Although the EAT’s confirmation of the application of perceptive discrimination to 
disability is welcome, Coffey is in other ways disappointing; it is likely to lead to a series of 
denials by decision-makers about the scope of their perception. However, this hurdle may 
be easier for people with disfigurements to overcome than for people with some other 
types of disability. This is because a moderate disfigurement, which is perceived by the 
employer to be severe, should be able to bypass the ‘substantial adverse effect’ test 
contained in s.6; severe disfigurements (presumably including perceived severe 
disfigurements) are treated as satisfying that definition. Does this make a difference? 
Seemingly, yes. It means there is nothing for the respondent to put his mind to save for 
whether the claimant has a severe disfigurement. Comments like those envisaged in our 
fictional scenario would seem to make it difficult for the respondent to deny this 
perception. A perceived disability claim may prove a useful alternative where the severity of 
the disfigurement is contested. 
 
                                                     
110 The Chief Constable of Norfolk v Coffey UKEAT/0260/16/BA, para 51. 
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Perceptive discrimination claims can also apply where the perpetrator knew the 
victim not to have the characteristic which formed the basis of the harassment111; in English, 
for example, the people harassing Mr English knew him not to be gay but harassed him with 
homophobic abuse anyway. One of the judges in that case noted as ‘barely perceptible’112 
the distinction between someone harassed because he is believed to be gay and someone 
harassed as if he were believed to be gay. Although the facts of the case are perhaps 
unusual – claims where people are harassed as if they had a severe disfigurement even 
when they are known not to have one will be few and far between – the court’s approach 
has important implications for disability law in two respects. First, the court placed the focal 
point of its analysis firmly on the discriminatory conduct, not on the characteristic of the 
victim. This affirms the social model’s external focus and contrasts with the Act’s approach 
to severe disfigurement, where the threshold test excludes many claims at the hurdle of 
proving disability. Second, in English, Sedley LJ recognised that sexual orientation is a matter 
which many people may prefer to keep private113, so the law should not require its 
disclosure in order to challenge discrimination. Given the ‘gruelling and personally 
invasive’114 process of having one’s impairment publicly scrutinised in a disability claim, this 
recognition of needing to balance privacy with principles of legal process is welcome; 
requiring someone to undergo a public analysis about whether they are both severely 
disfigured and disabled is a doubly unreasonable impediment to accessing justice.  
 
                                                     
111 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Equality Act 2010 Code of Practice, Employment 
(The Stationery office Limited 2011) para 7.10.  
112 English (n109) para 38, per Sedley LJ. 
113 ibid para 39. 
114 Lawson (n1) 361. 
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Where the claim relates to discrimination on the basis of actual, rather than 
perceived, disability, it is hard to conceive how to prove disability (as it is currently defined 
in the Act, at least) without the intrusion of some enquiry. But the CRPD requires procedural 
accommodations to ensure that justice is accessible115. The Employment Tribunals have the 
power to make anonymity orders and restricted reporting orders but the requirements for 
these orders to be made are stringent. This is an area which could be further developed to 
prevent worthwhile claims being deterred.    
 
 
Reasonable adjustments  
 
The second area worthy of specific mention, but perhaps overlooked in its potential to assist 
people with disfigurements, is the duty to make reasonable adjustments. Unlike the issues 
discussed already, the duty does not affect whether someone with a disfigurement is 
deemed to be disabled, but how they should be treated once that threshold is assumed to 
have been met. The concept of reasonable accommodation is also provided in the CRPD116. 
 
The duty to make reasonable adjustments under the Act applies to the following 
scenarios:  
                                                     
115 The UN’s 2017 recommendations to the UK included a variety of measures to make 
justice more accessible for disabled people, including increased availability of legal aid and 
reasonable adjustments in the justice system. See Concluding Observations on the Initial 
Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 3 October 2017, 
CRPD/C/GBR/CO/1. 
116 CRPD art 5(3). For a discussion on the CRPD duty generally and how it compares to the 
duty under the Act, see for example, Sarah Fraser Butlin, 'The UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities: Does the Equality Act 2010 Measure up to UK International 
Commitments?' (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 428, 435. 
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1. where a provision criterion or practice (“PCP”) puts a disabled person at a substantial 
disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are 
not disabled; 
2. where a physical feature (of premises) puts a disabled person at a substantial 
disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are 
not disabled; and 
3. where a disabled person would, but for the provision of an auxiliary aid, be put at a 
substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons 
who are not disabled. 
 
The requirement is to take such steps as are reasonable to avoid the disadvantage (in the 
case of the first and second requirements) or provide the auxiliary aid (for the third 
requirement).   
 
The application of the duty to disfigurements is not initially obvious in the way that it 
would be for a disability with a clear functional consequence. While a ramp may provide a 
neat solution to the disadvantage of an office entrance step for someone in a wheelchair, 
the mechanics of adjustment are perhaps more obscure where the impairment is a 
disfigurement. I would argue, however, that the duty can be applied practically for the 
benefit of many people with a visible difference, and a number of potential applications will 
now be put forward. 
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  Auxiliary aids are unlikely to be relevant for someone with a ‘pure’ disfigurement 
without functional limitation. Physical features of premises, too, often represent no 
problem for people with a disfigurement, though there are some exceptions; for example, 
both cold and dry air can exacerbate psoriasis symptoms, and artificial and natural light can 
aggravate photo-dermatological skin conditions, potentially requiring adaptions to air 
conditioning settings, workplace lighting, or seating arrangements. Such issues need to be 
assessed on a case by case basis. 
PCPs, though, have broader relevance. One example of a formal PCP is company 
‘look policies’ and dress codes.  Although prescriptive policies setting out how members of 
staff should present themselves are unusual, many employers have some kind of uniform 
requirement; the company polo shirt is, after all, what led to Mr Edwards’ claim. Rigid 
enforcement of such a dress code may place employees with a severe disfigurement at a 
substantial disadvantage. In Riam Dean v Abercrombie and Fitch117, for example, the 
employee had been allowed to wear a cardigan on the shop floor to hide the join of her 
prosthetic arm. When a manager asked her to remove the cardigan and she refused, she 
was told to work in the stock room as she didn’t comply with the company’s look policy. The 
Tribunal upheld her claim of harassment and found that there had been a withdrawal of a 
reasonable adjustment relating to the cardigan, as well as a wrongful dismissal. Although 
the claimant on this occasion preferred to cover up, it is submitted that the opposite 
situation – had she been asked to cover up by wearing a cardigan, for example - would also 
have been unlawful. 
                                                     
117 Unreported August 2009. 
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PCPs relating to performance evaluation may prove problematic given the 
subconscious tendency to associate negative character traits with visibly different people 
(which was discussed in Part 1). Policies which involve making judgments about staff may 
need to be adjusted to remove the possibility of any hidden discriminatory bias.  A 
particular area of concern is soft skills such as ‘teamworking ability’, ‘attitude’ or ‘ambition’ 
which are almost invariably subjective and could easily be influenced by unfounded 
assumptions of how popular, employable or capable someone is likely to be. Ongoing 
training for managers about implicit bias and its effects seems to offer potential for 
improvements118 by making subconscious bias and its effects conscious, but evaluation 
scoring systems can also be made clearer and linked to objectively verifiable criteria.     
 
PCPs sometimes relate to the nature of the role itself. Returning to the psychological 
consequences identified earlier, some people with a visible difference report feeling 
particularly uncomfortable meeting new people119. A role requirement to give external 
presentations or attend networking events, for example, could therefore put an employee 
at a substantial disadvantage compared with someone who is not disabled. Even where the 
employer is aware of the disfigurement, though, the employee may need to expressly 
explain the nature of this substantial disadvantage in order to trigger the duty to make 
reasonable adjustments120 as, unlike the ‘wheelchair and office step’ scenario envisaged 
                                                     
118 See, in the context of implicit racial bias: Patricia G. Devine and others, 'Long- term 
reduction in implicit race bias: A prejudice habit-breaking intervention' (2012) 48 Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 1267. 
119 Robinson (n44) 103. 
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(2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal 194, 208. 
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earlier, it may not be reasonable for an employer to investigate such an adjustment without 
knowledge of this impact on the employee.  
 
Once aware of the disadvantage relative to people who are not disabled, the 
employer is under a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the PCP creating that 
disadvantage. Possible reasonable adjustments could include role support, such as 
mentoring and social skills training, or a variation of role duties.  Open communication is 
important, to prevent requests for alterations to the work itself being ‘interpreted … as an 
employee “being awkward”’121 and to prevent unjustified assumptions.  
 
A final category of PCP worth particular mention in this context, given the social 
difficulties complained of by some, relates to employee relations. In Smith v HM Prison 
Service122, the employer was found to have failed to make reasonable adjustments for an 
employee with a severe facial disfigurement by failing to prevent continued bullying. It is 
pertinent here that the bullying was directed not just at the Claimant but also some of her 
colleagues; there was negative equality of treatment. But the Tribunal recognised the 
claimant’s heightened sensitivity to bullying in the light of her condition (which the 
employer should also have been aware of) which placed her at a substantial disadvantage in 
comparison with people who were not disabled.  
 
                                                     
121 Deborah Foster, 'Legal obligation or personal lottery?' (2007) 21 Work, Employment & 
Society 67, 77. 
122 Unreported, August 10, 2004. See IDS Diversity at Work 9 (March 2005) 22. 
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The need for the employer to become aware of the employee’s relative substantial 
disadvantage means that the duty to make reasonable adjustments is reactive, rather than 
anticipatory123. In other words, it ‘looks back’ at the barriers created, instead of requiring 
employers to take steps to prevent the barriers which can create disability, such as 
embedding disability and disfigurement equality into policies and staff training. With recent 
research by the Equality and Human Rights Commission124 highlighting that attitudinal 
change is a long process, not a quick fix, the reactive duty misses an opportunity to begin 
tackling that process as early as possible.   
 
Despite this lack of an anticipatory legal obligation, however, it is encouraging to 
note that a number of large employers, from both the private and public sectors, have 
signed up as members of the ‘Face Equality at Work’125 campaign run by the charity, 
Changing Faces, committing to strive to create a workplace where people are judged on 
ability and potential rather than appearance. As well as the moral and legal advantages in 
creating an inclusive workplace irrespective of appearance, the charity highlights the 
financial incentives of inclusion too; the potential reputational gains to the company, 
increased staff skill retention, and the benefits of customer loyalty.  
 
                                                     
123 Lawson, 'Disability and Employment in the Equality Act 2010: Opportunities Seized, Lost 
and Generated' (n1) 368. 
124 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Summary report: Tackling Prejudice and 
discrimination’ (2017) 5 <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-
download/tackling-prejudice-and-discrimination-summary-report> accessed 9 April 2018. 




Although the duty to make reasonable adjustments has an important role to play in 
visible difference, awareness may be a significant block on its application; a recent survey by 
the charity Changing Faces found that nearly half of those people with a visible difference 
who responded were unaware that severe disfigurement was included as a disability in the 
Act126.  Research on the extent to which reasonable adjustments are being applied in 
practice to employees with a visible difference is ongoing.  
 
Part 3 Options for reform  
 
From the above analysis, two key legal themes emerge: i) there are important limitations in 
the way the Act defines disability which consists of severe disfigurement, and ii) a lack of 
awareness of the law inhibits enforcement of rights and misses an opportunity to embed 
equality for those with a visible difference. Options for reform will now be considered in the 
light of these twin themes.  
 
One answer is to bring the Act’s disability definition more in line with the approach 
taken in the CRPD and the social model. A definition which focused at least partly on 
external barriers could include people who are visibly different without the friction caused 
by trying to bolt on a separate disfigurement provision. However, as noted earlier, that 
suggestion is perhaps a little idealistic given the deliberate choice taken by Parliament to 
situate the definition of disability in the Act within the medical model. Similarly, while the 
                                                     
126 Changing Faces (n43). 
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creation or extension of positive equality duties could offer proactive potential, optimism on 
this front is muted given that the s.149 duty on public bodies was recently pared back127.  
 
A pragmatic solution in the short term would be to advance some discrete changes 
to the Act to remove or mitigate the ‘severity’ requirement for disfigurements and expressly 
include progressively disfiguring and ‘complex’ conditions. These discrete changes have the 
potential to remove many of the legal inconsistencies and limitations noted earlier. But 
what they lack is the potential to increase awareness, either among the general public or 
people who are visibly different. In this respect, it is submitted that a charter mark approach 
may offer the potential both to raise awareness of disfigurement prejudice and spread good 
practice. The Athena SWAN charter on gender equality128, though voluntary, has been 
widely adopted in the Higher Education community and, in some cases, is being externally 
reinforced through criteria for research grants. A similar initiative based on appearance has 
potential, especially as the Face Equality at Work campaign by Changing Faces already 
demonstrates the willingness of some household name employers to engage with these 
issues. 
 
An alternative approach is to reconceptualise the link between disfigurement and 
disability so that the rights of visibly different people are recognised independent of 
disability. Two possibilities will be considered: the creation of a separate protected 
                                                     
127 See, for example, Bob Hepple, 'Enforcing Equality Law: Two Steps Forward and Two Steps 
Backwards for Reflexive Regulation' (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 315, 319; Manfredi, 
Vickers and Clayton-Hathaway (n67) 4. 
128 Equality Challenge Unit, Athena SWAN charter, <www.ecu.ac.uk/equality-
charters/athena-swan/> accessed 9 April 2018. 
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characteristic of disfigurement129 and the prohibition of general appearance discrimination, 
which already exists in France, Belgium130 and some local laws (to varying degrees) in 
America131.  
 
In addition to its awareness-raising potential, the partial separation of disfigurement 
into its own protected characteristic could provide an opportunity to resolve the uneasy 
relationship between the ‘social model’ disfigurement concept and the ‘medical model’ 
disability provisions, which lies at the root of much of the legislative friction identified 
earlier. The reference to ‘partial’ separation reflects the fact that the inclusive concept of 
disability in the CRPD would still encompass disfigurement, enabling the two concepts to 
retain a degree of unity over the disabling barriers they encounter. 
 
However, separation would also bring difficulty. First, the law needs to ensure 
sufficient permeability to provide for ‘complex’ disfiguring conditions involving both visible 
difference and functional impairment. Given the failure of the Act to achieve this 
combination under the single characteristic of disability, it may prove even harder across 
characteristics. Second, the definition of disfigurement is likely to lead to problems similar 
to those already encountered, including the deterrent effect of the terminology of 
disfigurement, and a lack of clarity of scope; in the words of one American author: 
 
                                                     
129 Changing Faces, Evidence (EQD0131) (of Lords Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 
and Disability 2015). This document proposes a separate characteristic of facial 
disfigurement. 
130 Belgium prohibits discrimination due to physical or genetic characteristics. 
131 Deborah Rhodes, The Beauty Bias (Oxford University Press 2010), 126. 
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‘It (…) seems an arbitrary distinction to say that an employer cannot refuse to hire a 
person who has a disfiguring scar on his chin, for example, but can refuse to hire 
someone whose chin is jutting or unusually shaped’132.  
 
General appearance discrimination, on the other hand, avoids this difficult 
distinction; appearance is a spectrum which applies to everyone, there are no threshold 
tests of severity, or even disfigurement, to meet in order to qualify for protection. 
‘Appearance’ also enables the blunt terminology of disfigurement to be removed.  
  
However, general appearance laws bring their own complications. Some employers 
argue that hiring good-looking staff is a valid commercial consideration133 and morally no 
different from hiring based on intelligence, which is outside of the individual’s control134 in 
the same way as immutable appearance characteristics like hair colour and the size of one’s 
ears.   
 
Much of the academic discussion about appearance discrimination addresses the 
concept not from a disfigurement perspective, but in terms of its ability to counter the 
‘beauty is good’135 stereotype (under which people subconsciously associate beauty with 
                                                     
132 Anonymous, 'Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment 
Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance' (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 2035, 
2045. 
133 Robert J Barro, 'So you want to hire the beautiful. Well why not?' Business Week (USA  
<https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/barro/files/98_0316_hire_bw.pdf>accessed 1 March 
2018; Samuel V. Bruton, 'Looks‐Based Hiring and Wrongful Discrimination' (2015) 120 
Business and Society Review 607. 
134 Barro, ibid. 
135 Karen Dion, Ellen Berscheid and Elaine Walster, 'What is beautiful is good' (1972) 24 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 285. 
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positive character traits, and vice versa, as discussed in Part 1). While bringing this implicit 
bias into the public consciousness may benefit people who are visibly different, aligning 
disfigurement with the debate about how to determine nuances of appearance136 may 
result in a diluted recognition of the reality of living with visible difference. One 
commentator opined that: 
 
‘while early cases may involve plaintiffs with severe facial disfigurement, the 
concept of “mindless incrementalism” so familiar to employment law will likely soon 
take over … those seeking to take advantage of a cause of action for appearance 
discrimination are soon likely to expand beyond the severely disfigured to the 
merely homely or unkempt’.’137  
 
In the US, a few local appearance discrimination laws sit alongside equality law 
applicable to people with disfigurements in the Americans with Disabilities Act.   Evidence 
suggests that most of the appearance laws are little enforced138; but enforcement is only 
part of the issue and the potential of such laws to raise the public consciousness and change 
behaviours remains139. 
 
                                                     
136 Heather R. James, 'If you are attractive and you know it, please apply: appearance based 
discrimination and employers' discretion' (2008) 42 Valparaiso University Law Review 629, 
660. 
137 James J. McDonald, Jr., 'Civil rights for the aesthetically- challenged.(physical appearance 
discrimination)' (2003) 29 Employee Relations Law Journal 118, 127. 
138 Rhodes, The Beauty Bias (n131) 127. 
139 ibid 139. 
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In summary, a range of steps could be taken to address the twin themes of legal 
scope and raised awareness. But choosing a path for reform is not straightforward. 
Underlying the different options for change, there are issues of self and group identity, in 
particular as regards the relationship between visible difference and disability. Low levels of 
reported disfigurement discrimination claims mean that the application of the legislation 
has not regularly received judicial scrutiny and, perhaps as a consequence, little public 
debate has taken place. Consultation may therefore prove a fruitful next step both in raising 




This article has argued that the Act fails to reflect the principles and standards of equality 
required by the CRPD and the social model of disability. The terminology, test and 
procedure of proving severe disfigurement themselves inhibit access to justice and fail to 
respect the dignity of people who are visibly different.  The inclusion of a ‘severity’ 
threshold is inconsistent with both reports of the lived experience, which show the potential 
for more minor disfigurements to have profound social and psychological effects, and the 
lower ‘substantial’ threshold which applies to other types of impairment. It is conceivable 
that this has contributed to low levels of enforcement and awareness. 
 
A failure to include progressively disfiguring conditions within the Act’s remit not 
only fails to mitigate the unfairness of the severity threshold, but also creates inequality 
between people with a visible difference and people with other types of impairment. 
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Similarly, the Court’s restrictive ‘aesthetic’ interpretation of the severe disfigurement 
provision creates an additional hurdle for claimants with complex disfiguring conditions.  
 
Although the duty to make reasonable adjustments and the concept of perceptive 
discrimination may prove useful in some cases, there is still a need for increased awareness 
and guidance on these issues specific to disfigurement.  
 
In conclusion, the current law on disfigurement in the workplace is not fit for 
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